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STATE OF UTAH 
MACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This Brief of Fact and Law is supplemental to De-
fendant's Brief on Appeal. 
Defendant incorporates all parts of its Brief on Ap-
peal and specifically makes them a part hereof. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The latter portion of Plaintiff's Statement of the 
Nature of the Case is misleading. The Court arrived at 
its amount of judgment as set forth hereafter in this 
Brief on page 12. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant incorporates the Statement of Facts con-
tained in his Brief on Appeal. Defendant further com-
ments on the Statements of Facts set out by Plaintiff 
as follows: 
1. The trucks were driven to Mack Trucks' lot in 
February of 1970, and Mack Financial is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Mack Trucks. 
The Denver outlet of Mack Trucks is a company 
outlet and not an agency or dealer. R-30. 
Also, Mack Financial was not concerned with pos-
session of the vehicles because Mack Trucks had posses-
sion and control. R-46 and 47. 
Mr. Roddy (Manager at Mack Trucks) asked Mr. 
Adams (Manager at Mack Financial) if they could 
dispose of the trucks. He was told that they could not, 
thus showing the control of Mack Financial over the 
trucks. R-115 and 116. 
2. There is a conflict of testimony regarding the 
Second Point cited by the Plaintiff. 
3. The word abandoned is used by Counsel many 
places in Plaintiff's Brief. This use of word is not consist-
ent with the facts. The trucks were not abandoned. They 
were delivered to Mack Trucks, a factory representative, 
and Mack Trucks took the vehicles into custody, posses-
sion and care. At no time were the vehicles abandoned 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in fact or in law, and the lower court made no such find-
ing. 
4. There is a conflict of testimony on the Fourth 
Point and the matter has been fully treated in the De-
fendant's Brief on Appeal. 
5. The record indicates that Scott Trucking had 
freight business, but the witness clearly indicates that 
Scott had this business, before the purchase contract 
was entered into for the vehicles. The conclusion that 
the freight business was a consideration for the purchase 
of the vehicles is not supported by the evidence. R-160 
and 161. 
6. Defendant admits the published notices in the 
newspaper. The notice to counsel only appears as a 
part of the Brief which counsel submitted to the Trial 
Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and is 
nowhere sustained in the evidence. The Finding of Fact 
No. 13, is not substantiated by any evidence adduced at 
the Trial. 
7. Defendant admits that the documents contain a 
provision providing for a reasonable attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT AMPLY TREATED QUES-
TION OF JURISDICTION IN HIS BRIEF 
ON APPEAL. PLAINTIFF ADDS NOTHING 
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EITHER BY WAY OF CASES, STATUTES 
OR ARGUMENT TO THAT POINT. 
POINT II. 
THE METHOD OF SALE OF THE VE-
HICLES WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REA-
SONABLE FOR TWO REASONS: (A) FAIL-
URE TO GIVE NOTICE; AND (B) FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE SALE WAS NOT 
MADE FOR TWO YEARS AFTER THE RE-
POSSESSION. 
The remedy for a sale which is not commercially 
reasonable should be the loss of any deficiency. The 
Plaintiff in his Point II relies heavily on a line of cases 
which the most recent is reflected in Grant County Trac-
tor Company v. Nuss, 496 Pac. 2d 966, 6 Washington 
Appeals, 866. It is believed that the facts of the case are 
distinguishable from the case at law which this Court 
is considering on a number of grounds, the most important 
of which is that the buyers rescinded their contract and 
gave written notice of such rescision. 
There may be many reasons why a sale may not be 
a commercially reasonable sale. It is Defendant's position 
that the sale conducted by the Plaintiff was not commer-
cially reasonable for two reasons (one would be suffi-
cient) : 
a. No notice of sale was given the Defendants, and 
b. The sale was held two years after repossession. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The plaintiff cites cases to show that public policy 
frowns on forfeitures. The requested finding is not a for-
feiture nor a penalty, but a common sense approach to 
a problem which would not exist if the Plaintiff had given 
notice of sale, or if the Plaintiff had otherwise conducted 
a commercially reasonable sale. Since all of the elements 
of choice reside with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff chooses 
the place, manner and the notice and even the accept-
ance of a figure of sale, and where no notice of sale is 
given the Defendant so that the Defendant can monitor 
the method of sale and indeed can bring in persons to bid, 
then the true market value of the security being sold 
cannot easily be determined. Where should the burden 
of determining the exact amount of damages fall? On the 
Plaintiff who caused the problem, or on the Defendant 
who should have the right to appear and establish sales 
price by positive action? In a Wyoming case, October 18, 
1972, the Court said: 
"Even so, we are persuaded that one general 
principal upon which Plaintiffs rely is applicable 
here, that is, compliance with 34-9-504(3) is a 
condition precedent to recovery of any deficiency 
"'"*' between sale price of collateral and the amount 
of the unpaid balance . . . The law requires more 
than a reasonable expectation on the part of the 
debtor if the notice requirement of the commer-
cial code is to be satisfied. Where Plaintiffs 
have not been informed as to whether Defen-
dants contemplated private or public sale of 
diamond bracelet. . . and did not waive demand 
to redeem and notice of time and place of sale, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendants were not entitled to recovery or 
allege deficiency of interest and attorney's fees." 
Aimonetto v. Keeps, Wyoming, October 18, 1972, 501 
Pac. 2d 1017. 
The facts of the above case parallel the facts at bar. 
The real purchaser, Scott, had returned the vehicles. De-
fendant was a guarantor of Scott's contract and entitled 
to Notice. 
The Colorado Appeals Court, Colorado held: 
"The sale of automobiles is not a recognized mar-
ket under 9-504(3), and since there is no recog-
nized market . . . the debtors were entitled to 
notice of sale of the repossessed automobiles." 
The Court also stated: 
"In an action to recover the deficiency judgment, 
the burden is upon the secured party to prove 
the amount of the deficiency. Whenever the 
value of a collateral is at issue, there is a pre-
sumption that the value of the repossessed col-
lateral equals the value of the outstanding debt." 
Community Management Association of Colorado 
Springs, Inc., v. Ford Motor Company, Colorado Appeals, 
505 Pac. 2d 1314. 
The above cases exemplify the two lines of authority 
in recent cases in the United States dealing with sales of 
secured items and the treatment of those sales, When 
those sales have not been in a commercially reasonable 
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manner. As nearly as Counsel can determine, the question 
is one of first impression in the State of Utah. In making 
such a determination, it would appear that the failure to 
give notice is a special type of sale which is not commer-
cially reasonable. Where notice of sale has not been given, 
it would appear that the sale is more defective and to a 
greater degree more commercially unreasonable than for 
some other impropriety of sale. The Defendant in this 
action maintains that the sale was not commercially rea-
sonable, and that the sale of the vehicles two years after 
they had been repossessed was damaging to the Defen-
dant, by reason that there was no notice of sale given. 
If the sale was commercially unreasonable, as we main-
tain, then there is no question under the law, that the 
Defendant is entitled to recover damages. The next ques-
tion that arises is what is the measure of damages. The 
lower Court held that the damages consisted of the differ-
ence between what the vehicles would have sold for had 
they been sold promptly by June 30, 1970, and not two 
years later. The Trial Court made a finding with respect 
to this amount of damages. The next question that arises 
is, would a different rule of law apply if the commercially 
unreasonable transaction arose from the failure to give 
notice. We maintain that it would. If notice is not given, 
then the sale which occurs with respect to the Defendant, 
at least, is essentially, a private sale. The Defendant is 
not allowed to appear and monitor the sale, and is not 
allowed to appear and determine for himself the final 
condition of the vehicles being sold; the defendant is not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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allowed to appear with his own buyers or to make his own 
tender and purchase such as to reduce or completely 
eliminate any deficiency which might be assessed. As a 
result of this, the Courts have held that where a notice 
of sale is not given that even if the line of reasoning for-
feiting the deficiency is not followed, that the burden falls 
heavily upon the Plaintiff to show that the sale price was 
a fair price, and that there is a presumption that the value 
of the goods sold would equal the amount of the indebt-
edness. 
In this case, we maintain, that the Court should follow 
the reasoning in the line of cases requiring the deficiency 
to be forfeited where notice is not given. However, if 
that line of reasoning is not followed, the Plaintiff must 
bear the burden of proof of overcoming the presumption 
that the security is equal to the outstanding indebted-
ness. The number of believable witnesses testified that 
the value of the vehicles was much greater than that 
which was the purchase price, and much greater than 
that which was determined by the lower court (See Find-
ing 22, Review of Testimony on value of vehicles in De-
fendant's Brief). 
For the above reasons, it is submitted that there 
should be no deficiency assessed against the Defendant. 
POINT III. 
P L A I N T I F F ERRONEOUSLY STATES 
THAT THE COURT FOUND APPELLANT 
HAD RECEIVED NOTICE. 
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This allegation is not borne out by the evidence. It 
is not found in Finding No. 13. It is not found in R-633 
and R-634 of the record. The letter of Counsel was not in-
troduced into evidence and no evidence was introduced 
showing any notice of any type to Defendant. Defendant 
was entitled to notice and there was simply no notice 
given. In addition to the portion of the case cited by 
Plaintiff in his Brief (Nelson v. Monarch Investment 
Plan of Henderson, Inc., 451 S. W. 2d 375, C. A. Ky. 1970), 
the Court stated: 
"Requirement of reasonable notification to de-
faulting maker of note of time after which a pri-
vate sale or repossessed automobile is to be made 
by holder of note means that maker is entitled 
to notification of specific date after which holder 
may proceed to dispose of collateral." 
Debtor's knowledge that repossessed automobiles 
would eventually be sold to satisfy indebtedness did not 
constitute reasonable notification of time after which 
private sale could properly be made by creditor. 
We also point out that the facts differ greatly in the 
cited case since the case referred to was a judicial sale 
made during the process of litigation. 
Unless the publication of the notice in newspapers 
in Denver can be construed to be notice to the Defendant, 
there simply was no notice given to Defendant of the 
sale. 
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POINTS IV AND V. 
POINTS IV AND V COVERING THE VAL-
UES OF THE VEHICLES AND THE RE-
PAIRS WERE TREATED BY DEFENDANT 
IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF. 
POINT VI. 
THE FIGURE OF THE SALE AMOUNT AND 
OF THE DAMAGES SHOULD BE CRED-
ITED TO DEFENDANT AS OF THE DATE 
THAT THE SALE SHOULD HAVE OC-
CURRED. 
Plaintiff's Brief seems to miss the following points. 
1. That the Court found the vehicles to be in con-
trol of Plaintiff in January, 1970, and that June 30, 1970, 
was a reasonable time when the sale should have been 
made. 
2. The sale in January of 1972 was not therefore 
commercially reasonable, and the Defendant was there-
fore entitled to a counterclaim offset of $40,700.00 as an 
amount lost at that time by virtue of the fact that the 
sale did not take place timely. 
3. It is also apparent that if the sale had occurred 
in June, 1970, the total sale price would have been ob-
tained on that date, and there would have been no further 
interest to be charged above the total sales price of 
$85,450, all of which should have been deducted from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sums due as of June 30, 1970. To allow the Plaintiff to 
deduct $44,700 at the sale date in January, 1972, instead 
of the date when the sale should have been made allows 
the Plaintiff to benefit from his own wrongdoing. In the 
Memorandum Opinion, the Court stated: "Interest 
should be recomputed on the basis that the sale should 
have been completed by June 30, 1970." R-45. 
The first full paragraph contained on page 23 of 
Plaintiffs Brief states that the Trial Court used the fore-
going figures in arriving at its conclusion. The Trial Court 
submitted no such figures nor accounting, but the account-
ing was submitted by Plaintiff. We submit that the ac-
counting is in error. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CALCULATION 
$109,673.97 
Plus 2lA months' interest to June 30, 
1970 at 10.5% 2,399.11 
TOTAL INTEREST AND PRINCI-
PAL TO 6/30/70 112,073.08 
Less Proceeds of sale 44,700.00 
67,373.08 
Less $40,750 (additional a m o u n t 
which vehicles would have sold for 
on June 30, 1970 40,750.00 
26,623.08 
Plus out-of-pocket expenses 2,477.31 
29,100.39 
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Plus interest on $26,623.08 to June 10, 
1972, at 10.5% 5,590.84 
Plus interest on $29,100.39 from June 
10, 1972, through May 31, 1973 3,055.53 
TOTAL JUDGMENT $ 37,746.76 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT CALCULATION 
Explanation Amount 
April 15, 1970, Payoff $109,673.97 
Interest to June 30, 1970 2,399.12 
Total Due on June 30, 1970 $112,073.09 
Less Loss for Non-Sale as of June 30, 
1970 40,750.00 
Total Due after Adjustment on June 
30, 1970 71,323.09 
Interest from July 1, 1970 to June 30, 
1970 7,488.92 
Total Due as of June 30, 1971 78,812.01 
Interest from July 1, 1971, through 
January, 1972 4,827.24 
Total Due through January, 1972 83,639.25 
Costs of Sale 2,477.31 
Less Sales Price 44,700.00 
Balance after Sale 41,416.56 
Interest from February 1,1972 to Jan-
uary 31, 1973 4,348.74 
Total Due as of January 31, 1973 $ 45,765.30 
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POINT VII. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT IT WAS NOT 
OBLIGATED TO REPOSSESS THE SEVEN 
TRUCKS IN QUESTION IS IN ERROR. 
Mack Financial did repossess the trucks in question 
and did exercise control and care over the trucks even to 
the point of telling Mack Trucks when or whether they 
could be sold and when they could be prepared for sale. 
The effect of Plaintiff completing an Affidavit for which 
they claim the repossession actually took place in Janu-
ary, 1972, was entirely self-serving and altered not at all 
the condition of the vehicles or their possession or their 
location or the power and authority exercised over those 
vehicles. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases to make the point 
that there is no repossession when a vehicle is taken into 
custody by a once seller of a vehicle. All of these cases 
may be distinguished in that the vehicles were either 
abandoned on the street without control or care where 
they could be damaged or destroyed, or the vehicles were 
burned beyond recognition or the vehicles were being sold 
under a Court Order or Writ of Replevin in which case 
the Court addresses itself to a thirty day statute requiring 
sale within thirty days of the repossession. 
Trial Court in Memorandum Decisions stated: 
"A comment is made in U. C. C. Reporting Ser-
vice, Paragraph 9 504 at page 104, that with re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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spect to Section 5072 that a secured party who 
without proceeding under Section 5052 held col-
lateral a long time without disposing of it thus 
running up a large storage charge against the 
debtor where no reason existed for not making 
a prompt sale might well be found not to have 
acted in a commercially reasonable manner. In 
doing so, it also makes specific reference to the 
section in good faith as cited above, supra." 
The Utah Court stated: 
"Conditional seller who repossessed property had 
duty to exercise reasonable diligence and effort 
to make resale of repossessed property within 
reasonable time to produce best possible pur-
chase price therefor, and creditor buyer with 
proceeds as specified in contract/' 
Knudsen Music Company v. Masterson, 240 Pac. 2d 
973. The case also is cited in the conclusion reached in a 
Washington case, Maestro Music, Inc. v. Rudolph Wert-
lizer Company, 354 Pac. 2d 266: 
"A conditional seller or his assignee must deal 
fairly so as to secure the best price reasonably 
possible and must make it bring its fair market 
value and account for the difference between the 
amount owed it and the fair market value of the 
product." 
Uniform Commercial Code in 70A-9-507(2): 
". . . If the secured party either sells the col-
lateral in the usual manner in any recognized 
market therefor or if he sells at the price cur-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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rent in such market at the time of such sale, or 
if he has otherwise sold in conformity with rea-
sonable commercial practices among dealers in 
the type of property sold, he has sold in a com-
mercially reasonable manner." 
The fact is that the vehicles were not sold in such 
manner; notice was not given and the vehicles were held 
for a period of two years before sale took place. It is sub-
mitted that under the best possible interpretation in 
favor of Plaintiff that the sale was not held in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
WITH RESPECT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ON THE CASE AND CONSISTENT WITH 
THE FINDING THAT THE SALE WAS NOT 
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE. 
Counsel in his Brief cites Exhibits 3P and 4P which 
provide that if the agreement shall be placed in the hands 
of an attorney for collection, the Buyer shall pay a reason-
able attorney's fees as specified in the document if per-
mitted by law. This was not a simple action of collection, 
but it was an action to resolve a number of very tangled 
issues involved in the disposition of a substantial amount 
of security. Just as important in the litigation were the 
Defendant's counterclaims against Plaintiff as were the 
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant. 
In 20 A. M. Jur. 2d Costs, Section 73, page 59, it is 
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stated: 
"Where authority is thus given (statute or con-
tract) for awarding of attorney's fees, the mat-
ter of their allowance rests in the discretion of 
the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion 
will not be disturbed by an appellate court ex. 
oept in the case of manifest abuse." 
A Utah Court stated August 10, 1945: 
"A debtor cannot be charged with failure to pay 
an obligation and be held in default where the 
default complained of is the result of the credi-
tor's failure to accept payment in accordance 
with the contract. . . " 
Homeowners Loan v. Washington, 161 Pac. 2d 355, 
108 Utah 469: 
The case before this court is analogous. 
Here the Defendant placed in the hands of the Plain-
tiff all of the vehicles, which, had they been sold on the 
market at that time or had they been retailed out, pur-
suant to the testimony of various persons who sought to 
make purchases of the trucks, this lawsuit might never 
have occurred. It might well be that the entire indebted-
ness could have been paid from the sale of the vehicles. 
Or, if the deficiency was of a reasonable nature, it would 
not have been necessary to initiate legal action to collect 
that deficiency. By virtue of the failure of the Plaintiff 
to assume its responsibility and minimize damages and 
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loss and to proceed to promptly sell at the best possible 
price the security which had been left with it, the Plain-
tiff brought its legal action for a ridiculous amount of 
$127,603.05, a figure which was completely unrelated to 
any sums due to the Plaintiff under the best possible in-
terpretation of the case. 
It is submitted that the trial court was correct in its 
denial of the petition to award attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
431 South Third East, B-l 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT DIGBY 
217 Luhrs Tower 
Phoenix, Arizona 85003 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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